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Prologue*
SANFORD N. KATZ*
Family law came of age during the last half of the twentieth century.
Earlier, in practice, scholarship, and legal education, it was given little
attention or respect. Perhaps the reason for the low status of family law
practice, defined narrowly as domestic relations and almost exclusively
concerned with divorce, was that it dealt with human conflicts and real
people in distress, not legal abstractions. It should also be remembered
that divorce, opposed by some religions, was a taboo subject, and the
status of a divorced person carried with it a social stigma. Therefore,
it was natural that the reputation of divorce lawyers would suffer. Major
law firms rarely accepted divorce cases, leaving them to be handled by
lawyers in small firms or single practitioners who were not members
of prestigious firms because of their religion, ethnicity, race, or sex.
Indeed, women were neither represented in large law firms nor admitted
to many law schools.
Even though family law was almost exclusively statutory, it had the
reputation of being essentially discretionary. Interpretations of phrases
like "in the best interests of the child" or "cruel and abusive conduct"
were thought to be more dependent on the mood of the judge than on
case law. In fact, judges who heard divorce cases were usually consid-
ered low-level. Perhaps the reason for that reputation was that divorce
trials were carried on with little regard for procedure or rules of evi-
dence. Basically, they were side bar discussions with the judge. A neg-
ative criticism of decisions in family law cases was that they were fact-
driven-as if decisions in other kinds of cases were not. Appeals in
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family law cases were infrequent so that the trial judge was basically
the final decision-maker. It was rare for the U.S. Supreme Court to hear
a family law case.
In mid-century family law was stagnant. Little law reform occurred
in the 1940s. For one thing, few legislators were thinking about family
law during World War II and immediately afterwards. In 1945 the coun-
try was concerned with rebuilding its economy and providing oppor-
tunities for veterans to enter colleges and return to their jobs. Re-
entering the work force meant displacing women who had been an
important and vital part of industry during the war years. During that
period children of servicemen were raised by their working mothers, a
fact soon forgotten. After the war, women who lost their jobs resumed
their traditional role in the family. It is interesting to note what little
permanent impact World War II had on family organization. Looking
back it is hard to believe that the single parent family headed by a wife
and mother, thought to be noble and portrayed by Hollywood as heroic,
would be denigrated fifty years later by politicians.
During the decades of the 1940s and early 1950s, law schools were
not educating students to practice family law. Indeed, if a course in
family law was offered at all, it was a basic course, often taught by a
part-time lecturer. The casebook that dominated the field was Domestic
Relations edited by Albert C. Jacobs, president of Trinity College, and
Julius Goebel, Jr., professor of law at Columbia University Law School.
The major hornbook which was national in scope was Professor J.
Warren Madden's Handbook of the Law of Persons and Domestic Re-
lations. Unlike the law faculties at British and European universities,
which had renowned family law scholars, and where family law was
considered a serious intellectual study, American law schools had very
few major family law professors. Mostly they were senior scholars with
European backgrounds and interests in other disciplines, which they
related to family law.
The period of major changes in family law began in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. The latter decade and the one following might be
considered the most important era in the last half of the twentieth cen-
tury for the field. After almost ten years of lobbying efforts, the Amer-
ican Bar Association recognized family law as a specialty in 1958 and
established the Family Law Section. Judge Paul W. Alexander of Ohio,
the father of therapeutic divorce, was its first chair. Almost a decade
later, the Family Law Quarterly began publication.
Through the years the Family Law Section of the American Bar
Association has been a major force in reflecting the views of the prac-
ticing lawyer, yet from time to time, its leadership has consisted of
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family law professors. The Family Law Quarterly was established by
Rev. Robert F. Drinan, S. J., who was dean of Boston College Law
School and Chair of the Section. Its first Board of Editors had ten
members, eight of whom were law professors, one was an administra-
tive judge in a family court and another was a lawyer. The latter two
were women. The make-up of the Board was consistent with the Quar-
terly's goal of bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Since
its inception in 1967, articles in the Quarterly have been relied on in
major family law decisions, thus fulfilling its original mission.
Although it is hard to discern any consistent national family policy,
during the late 1950s and 1960s in both state capitals and in Washing-
ton, D.C., there seemed to have been a willingness to look at the family
in realistic terms and to address issues that had been dormant for years.
The civil rights movement left its imprint on family law with respect
to law reform and in raising consciousness about the protection of in-
dividual rights. At the same time through the efforts of governmental
programs and private foundations, people of limited income were given
access to legal services, which provided lawyers for family law cases
in court as well as for representation at federal and state administrative
hearings. A number of cases that have made major changes in family
law were the result of the work of legal services lawyers.
The legislative movement to recodify state family law, particularly
divorce law, began in mid-century. For example, attempts to change
the divorce law in New York can be traced back to 1945. New York's
recognition of adultery as the sole ground for divorce prompted lawyers
to engage in deceptive practices. In response to the reform efforts of
leaders of the New York Bar, the New York State Legislature broadened
the grounds for divorce in 1966, thus bringing New York into line with
other enlightened jurisdictions.
In 1969, California became the first state to enact a divorce law
without fault-based grounds. As state after state began to enact no-fault
divorce laws, the emphasis in divorce litigation shifted from proving
grounds for a fault-based divorce to rethinking the purpose of alimony,
and determining who should be awarded what property, and who should
be the custodian of the children. The concept of rehabilitative alimony
grew out of the discretionary powers of the judge in the 1960s, and
was adopted by courts who began to award alimony as a temporary
device to aid the dependent spouse (usually the wife) in becoming self-
supporting. This was a major change in alimony, which was a method
of spousal support after divorce, frequently for the wife's life, based
on her needs and the husband's ability to pay. In the 1970s states began
to examine their residency requirements for divorce jurisdiction, and
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slowly these requirements were shortened bringing some uniformity in
the country and lessening the need for a couple to leave their home
state to seek a divorce elsewhere.
An important influence on divorce reform were the efforts of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws who had been working on di-
vorce law for seventy-five years. Although the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, promulgated in 1970, was adopted in part only by eight
states, it should not be considered a complete failure because it suc-
ceeded in alerting lawyers that the time had come to replace the old
order with new ideas about marriage, divorce and child custody. Some
state bar associations responded by backing changes in their divorce
laws.
The Act introduced the concepts of irretrievable breakdown and eq-
uitable division of property, and enumerated factors for determining
both. Although it can be said that listing factors that judges must con-
sider in assigning property in divorce or in any other area of family
law decision-making is a legislative attempt at limiting a judge's dis-
cretion and in a way controlling judicial power, there are advantages
both for lawyers and judges. Factors are enormously helpful to lawyers
in organizing the amorphous amount of material in child custody and
matrimonial property litigation. Also, they can provide a judge with a
checklist for monitoring the presentation of evidence during trial as
well as for writing findings of fact.
The hesitation of some lawyers to advocate for the adoption of the
Act may well have been based on their belief that the Act would end
the kind of divorce practice to which they had become accustomed,
and basically complicate what was to them a simple process. After all,
under the title theory of property subscribed to in many states, he who
held property got it. What was more simple than that? With equitable
division of property, lawyers would have to ask the following questions
in preparing a divorce case for settlement or litigation: What is separate
and what is marital property? What factors should be used to determine
the characterization? What is its value? When should it be valued?
Little did lawyers realize when equitable distribution was first intro-
duced how complex it would be, and that they would need help from
other professions like accountants, pension and actuarial experts, and
real estate, business, and other valuators.
In child custody also, the Act brought clarity. The best interests of
the child which had been and continues to be the basis for determining
custody decisions was often criticized for being vague. The Act did
more than just state that a decision should be in the best interests of
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the child. It provided factors that judges were to consider in awarding
custody. This meant that judges were required to focus on, among other
matters, the environment in which the child was raised, the child's
relationship with her parents, friends, and others, as well as inquiring
into the child's own wishes and the mental and physical health of those
involved in the child's life. Just as experts in other fields were important
in marital property issues, they were also necessary in child custody.
Thus, psychiatrists, social workers, psychologists, educators and pedi-
atricians were consultants in child custody cases, both to lawyers in
preparation of their cases and to judges in reaching decisions.
At the time some states were reviewing their divorce laws and pro-
cedure, they were also considering court reform. Humanizing the di-
vorce process by utilizing alternatives to the adversary system in an
informal setting became a goal. Judge Paul W. Alexander had accom-
plished such procedural and court reforms in Toledo, Ohio, in the
1950s, but that has long been forgotten. In a way, Judge Alexander was
ahead of his time. Today we speak of negotiation, arbitration and me-
diation as if they were entirely new concepts. Lawyers educated in rules
of procedure and evidence and trained to argue find it difficult to think
of alternative methods of dispute resolution in family matters. But as
litigation becomes extremely expensive, as it is today in major metro-
politan areas, middle class divorcing couples may be forced to choose
mediation for purely economic considerations and failing that, to rep-
resent themselves in court, now seen more and more.
The bar's reluctance to promote the establishment of family courts
known for their informality and often providing social services to liti-
gants may be based on lawyers' belief that to do so would be retro-
gressive. To some, it would represent a return to the days of lax pro-
cedure, and perhaps turn courts into social service agencies. In addition,
the bar may believe that divorce practice, especially with regard to
marital property, is so complex that only the techniques derived from
the formal adversary process are appropriate. Yet, the bar has been more
receptive to the establishment of juvenile courts perhaps, because their
jurisdiction deals with the behavior of children, not with economic
matters.
In 1960, through the efforts of child welfare specialists at Children's
Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the
federal government focused on the condition of children. That agency
set up a working group to study the findings of a Denver, Colorado
pediatrician, Dr. C. Henry Kempe, and those of the Los Angeles Police
Department dealing with children who had been physically abused. The
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product of that group's deliberations was the Model Mandatory Child
Abuse Reporting Act.
Looking back, it is hard to imagine that developing a child abuse
reporting act would be controversial, but it was. Family privacy was
deeply rooted in American life and law. To invade it was thought to be
an infringement on fundamental parental rights. Requiring certain pro-
fessional people to report abuse would be a breach of confidential re-
lationships. Every aspect of the Act was criticized, from who was to
report, what was to be reported, and the penalties for not reporting. It
took time for the concept of reporting child abuse to an appropriate
state agency to be accepted, but eventually it was. The national concern
for the protection of children in their homes in the 1960s raised the
issue of the safety of others in the family. The reporting laws, greatly
expanded from the original model law, and now found in all jurisdic-
tions, may have laid the foundation for family violence laws that were
to follow.
A curious paradox may have resulted from the enactment of laws
meant to protect children. Mandated reporting of child abuse caused
significant increase in the foster care rolls, a disproportionate number
of whom were Black children. Was this just the result of overzealous
child welfare workers whose first response was removal? Or, had abuse
been occurring, but just had not been detected? For whatever reason,
the impact of state intervention on the family during the decade of the
1960s was most disruptive for poor urban Black families. It has been
said that their economic status made these families, forced to use public
rather than private facilities, more highly visible, and thus more vul-
nerable. All the major problems of the poor, especially the lack of
employment and educational opportunities, inadequate housing and
health care, were stressors on urban Black families. But, these families
suffered the additional burden of racial and social prejudices within
their communities and in the child protection system.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government began to sug-
gest solutions to the problem of foster care drift. It was then that the
idea of "permanency planning" was first promoted, and ultimately later
became part of child protection practice and law. The Children's Bureau
supported development of two model acts, the Model Act to Free Chil-
dren for Permanent Placement and the Subsidized Adoption Act. They
were designed to overcome barriers identified as preventing children
from being adopted and to encourage suitable couples, especially foster
parents, to adopt "hard to place" children. During these decades, the
plethora of negative social and economic conditions in many urban
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Black communities worsened. But there was no comprehensive na-
tional family policy that acknowledged the depth of the problems and
need for long-range planning to solve them. The piecemeal approach
was, and is, essentially applying small bandages to a major social
wound.
The federal government made more attempts to deal with child pro-
tection during the 1980s and 1990s. To that end it undertook a number
of initiatives, which had the effect of basically taking control of state
child protection systems. It promulgated regulations for foster care, to
which states had to adhere if they wished to secure funding for their
foster care and adoption programs. In addition it introduced the concept
of child support guidelines for states to adopt in order to bring some
sense of uniformity and fairness to the system, once again using eco-
nomic incentives as a method of encouraging use of the guidelines.
During the 1960s and 1970s the law school world began to realize
the importance of family law issues. Professor Homer H. Clark com-
pleted his first edition of The Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States in 1968, a development that greatly stimulated family law schol-
arship. Casebooks appeared, mostly influenced by Jacobs and Goebel,
at least in the order of the presentation of cases and materials. A book
that broke new ground, The Family and the Law, written by Professor
Joseph Goldstein and Dr. Jay Katz, a law professor and psychoanalyst
of Yale Law School, was published in 1965. Their 1,200 page volume
departed from the traditional family law case book in providing an
overall theoretical framework in which they asked fundamental ques-
tions about substantive family law and the legal process that handles
family law issues. Influenced by the approach of Yale law professor
Harold Laswell and the language of bankruptcy, they divided the family
law process into questions dealing with the establishment, administra-
tion, and reorganization of family law relationships. In addition, Pro-
fessors Goldstein and Katz brought Freudian psychology to bear on
family law. The seeds of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, written
by Professor Joseph Goldstein, Dr. Albert Solnit, and Anna Freud in
1973 were planted in The Family and the Law eight years earlier.
A nonlegal work that has had great influence on child custody is
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, which applied Anna Freud's
theory of child development to decisions about child placement. The
authors' focus was on a child's physical and emotional well being rather
than on other values or on parental rights. Based on years of clinical
experience, they concluded that a child needs continuity of care with
an adult who wants the child and can provide him or her with affection,
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stimulation, nurturing, and an assurance of safety and protection. In a
divorce case where the parents cannot resolve their child's custody,
Goldstein, Solnit and Freud wrote that the judge's job is to determine
who, among the claimants for custody, can fulfill those needs. They
introduced new terms like "psychological parent" and "least detri-
mental alternative," which have become part of the legal lexicon. Their
emphasis on continuity of care has been thought to be the basis for the
primary caretaker doctrine, which has found support in some jurisdic-
tions. The idea of minimizing modifications in child custody cases is
reflected in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
By 1970, the complexities of family law were becoming even more
visible. A spate of U.S. Supreme Court decisions are illustrative of that.
During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, the list of U.S. Supreme
Court cases that dealt with family relationships and children in the
judicial process was impressive: Ford v. Ford (1962), Armstrong v.
Manzo (1965), Kent v. United States (1966), In re Gault (1967), In re
Winship (1970), McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), Gomez v. Perez
(1973), Smith v. Organization of Foster Families (1977), Quilloin v.
Walcott (1978), Kulko v. Superior Court of California (1978), Bellotti
v. Baird (1979), Caban v. Mohammed (1979), Orr v. Orr (1979), and
Parham v. J. R. (1979). With these decisions, the Supreme Court was
not just setting down guiding principles, it was changing a culture.
A decade later it became clear that family law could no longer be
studied separate from constitutional law, contracts, torts, property, busi-
ness associations, trusts and tax. Because family law practice had be-
come so complex, it was not possible for lawyers to keep current in
every aspect of family law. As a result, sub-specialties developed. To
be an effective divorce lawyer one had to have a sophisticated knowl-
edge about the latest developments in tax and marital property, the latter
having been influenced by Professor Charles Reich's concept of "the
new property." Child protection lawyers needed to learn about the child
welfare system including the latest congressional enactments regulating
certain aspects of foster care and adoption. Knowledge about interna-
tional conventions being developed by The International Conference at
The Hague, and the ability to work with foreign law materials were
essential for international family law practice.
In the past twenty-five years major social and political movements
and advancements in reproductive technology have had a direct impact
on family law. The movements have not necessarily been successful in
making changes in the law although some have, but they have forced
legislators, judges, lawyers, and scholars to rethink the bases for laws
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relating to family life. Indeed, the American Law Institute, one of the
most prestigious law groups in the United States, which produces the
Restatement of Law series, has undertaken the job of drafting principles
of family law, which reflect the most current thinking in the field.
The legal landscape of today is shaped by many factors: the move-
ment for racial equality, children's rights, women's rights, gay and
lesbian rights, and the social and legal agenda of certain religious
groups. Marriage, for example, has undergone fundamental changes
because of its being considered a partnership, which a couple can al-
most define themselves by a prenuptial agreement. No longer does
marriage mean that a wife's identity-her name and her domicile, for
example-is totally linked to her husband's. Nor does marriage give a
husband license to violate his wife's bodily integrity. With these and
other changes, one can begin to see a movement reducing what was
clearly state-imposed inequality and dependency in marriage.
The institution of adoption is no longer monolithic. The traditional
model of adoption involves termination of a birth parent's parental
rights. The process is clothed in secrecy, and both adoption agency and
court records are sealed. A second model being developed by adult
adopted persons, some birth parents and lawyers is called "open adop-
tion" and has two meanings: open adoption records and post-adoption
visitation rights for birth parents.
Adult adopted children, suing in court, relating their individual sto-
ries to legislative committees and writing about them in the popular
press, have sought reform of adoption laws. Their aim was (and is) to
have access to their adoption records, not at the discretion of a judge
(the law in many states), but as a matter of right. Their efforts in the
1970s were unsuccessful both in the courts where they argued that they
were denied their constitutional right to equal protection of the law,
and in state legislatures.
The traditional model of adoption that does not allow the releasing
of identifiable information about birth parents to either the adoptive
couple or the child is actually only about seventy-five years old. Before
then, the confidentiality of adoption records was meant to prevent the
public, not the immediate parties, from inspecting them. Adoption
agency social workers introduced secrecy in the 1920s. They based
agency practice on the child development theory that a successful adop-
tion of an infant voluntarily relinquished at birth, required the complete
integration of the infant into her new family. One of the major argu-
ments against opening adoption records at the request of an adult
adopted person is that to do so would give priority to the interests of
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one member of the adoption triad over others. Opponents of open rec-
ords claim that changing the law would have serious consequences if
the new law were made retroactive since it would negate promises of
confidentiality given to the birth mother at the time of the child's re-
linquishment or at the adoption placement. There are signs, however,
that proponents of open adoption are having some success. One court
recently held that opening adoption records does not violate a birth
parent's right of privacy.
The traditional model of adoption severs the parent-child relation-
ship, which results in terminating both custodial and inheritance rights.
The modem view has been that if an infant were to have continuous
contact with her birth parents, she would have difficulty bonding with
her adoptive parents, and as she matured would be confused about her
loyalties and the objects of her affection. It was also believed that a
conditional relinquishment would not bring closure to a birth mother's
decision about adoption. Those theories, translated into agency prac-
tice, have prevailed until about the 1970s. Another argument used to
defeat post-adoption visitation rights has been that allowing it would
blur the distinction between foster care and adoption.
Granting a birth parent post-adoption visitation rights is finding some
receptivity in both the psychiatric literature and in the law. The major
legal advocates for this modification in adoption law, which is occur-
ring in some states, have been lawyers in the child protection system
representing either a social service agency or a birth parent. They see
an open adoption agreement as a useful legal strategy for facilitating a
settlement of a termination of parental rights case either before trial or
at appeal. To prevent the misuse of an open adoption agreement, Mas-
sachusetts regulates it by statute. For the agreement to be judicially
approved, a judge must be satisfied that the agreement was entered into
freely, was fair and reasonable, and furthers the child's best interests.
As the century ends, established principles in family law are increas-
ingly being challenged. The historic definition of marriage as a union
of a man and a woman is now seriously questioned. Recent legislation
has been enacted establishing two types of marriages, the choice being
determined by the kind of divorce a couple agrees to in advance. An
effort is now under way to make marriage-like relationships the legal
equivalent of marriage. No-fault divorce is being reconsidered, and a
return to fault-based divorce is seriously proposed. Finally, we are now
confronting the legal issues presented by a child conceived months after
the death of the child's father.
Future legal historians will have to determine what label to attach to
the twentieth century. Early on some called it the "Century of the
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Child." Others suggested the "Century of the Woman." In naming the
century in that way, are the authors stating that the most significant
event in family law has been the change in status of the child or of the
woman? If so, one must agree that some changes have occurred, par-
ticularly for married women. Without the advantage of hindsight, one
might consider the twentieth century as the "Century of the Person."
Such a description is broader in scope and encompasses both children
and women, but perhaps best describes the major concern in family
law at least during most of the last half of the century. Focusing on the
self de-emphasizes relationships, and reflects the American legal tra-
dition dating back to the founding of the country. On an individual
level, it can have deep sociological and psychological significance pos-
sibly leading to isolation, loneliness, and selfishness and threatening
the family itself. If indeed we have been living during the "Century of
the Person," we will have come full circle. In the beginning of the
century what we now refer to as family law was called the law of
persons, later it became the law of domestic relations and then family
law.
The family is being continuously redefined. Who will define it, and
the issues in family law that will provide substance for that evolving
definition is the task in the next century. One challenge will be to
balance the progress we have made in protecting individual rights with-
out weakening the family and the supporting relationships on which it
is based. If the last half of the century is any prologue for the future,
the next generation of lawyers, judges, legislators and law professors
is in for a future that we can neither predict nor imagine.
